





Accrediting bodies possess a great deal of sensitive information: data
harvested from accredited institutions through reports and inspection surveys;
intelligence provided by persons with an interest in influencing accreditation
decisions (including administrators, staff, employees, consumers, and complain-
ants); decisions and reports generated by the accreditor in the accreditation
process; and material regarding accreditation standards and procedures.
Indeed, accrediting bodies are in the information business.! Their primary
tasks include generating information in the form of accreditation standards that
define acceptable performance within a field, assembling information about
institutions that desire accreditation under those standards, processing that
information through various decisionmaking algorithms, and ultimately
producing information as to which institutions meet or fail to meet those
standards. Issues of control of information are thus of prime importance to
both accrediting bodies and those affected by their decisions. This article
considers these issues.
II
INFORMATION CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF ACCREDITATION
Historically, accrediting bodies have maintained strict confidentiality of
information provided to them and of information generated in the accreditation
process.2 This secrecy was grounded in the notion that accreditation was
fundamentally a process of peer review for self-improvement.3 Information
generated in that process was for the benefit of the reviewed institution and was
nobody else's business.4 Information was also kept confidential because of a
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1. See Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel:
An Antitrust Perspective (pt. 1), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 134-38 (1983) (discussing the informational
nature of accreditation).
2. PERSPECTIVES ON ACCREDITATION (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations), Jan. 1972, at 3; Courtney Leatherman, Disclosure Policies Make it Tough to Get Details
of Colleges' Accreditation Status, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 6, 1993, at A16.
3. Louis H. HEILBRON, CONFIDENTIALITY AND ACCREDITATION 10 (1976); Carl P. Schlicke,
Does the Joint Commission have a Future?, AM. SURGEONS BULL., Apr. 1978, at 7, 9.
4. HEILBRON, supra note 3; Schlicke, supra note 3.
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belief that openness and full disclosure to. the accreditor by the entity seeking
accreditation was fundamental to the peer review process, and that this
disclosure would be significantly chilled if the information disclosed could be
made public.' Under this peer review vision of accreditation, confidentiality of
information makes considerable sense.
There are, however, two alternative visions of the role of accreditation.
First, an accreditor could act as a private (or quasi-private) agent of public
regulation.6 Regulation of the quality of goods and services in particular
markets is arguably necessary because of market failures, which are normally
attributable to the lack of information.7 In the institutional health care sector,
for example, it is difficult for consumers to make informed purchasing decisions,
both because of the complexity of the product to be purchased and because of
the general inability of any one consumer to gain sufficient experience to be
able to evaluate the product.8 Either because the government wishes to avoid
the cost of policing the market itself, or because a private accreditor possesses
advantages that make it a superior regulator, the government may choose to
rely on industry self-regulation through industry standard-setting or accredita-
tion.9 Once the accreditor becomes a regulator, however, the government may
insist on access to information in the hands of the accreditor to assure its
accountability." To further assure accountability of the regulatory program to
the public, the public itself may need access to accreditation information under
some circumstances." Under this model, disclosure to the government is
necessary, and absolute confidentiality is not possible.
The second alternative model views accreditation as a means of assisting
consumers in comparing the quality of competing suppliers of goods and
services. If markets fail to operate efficiently because of the absence of useful
information about goods and services, a clear solution is to produce more or
5. This argument parallels closely the argument traditionally made for protecting confidentiality
in medical peer review proceedings within institutions. See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 50 F.R.D.
249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coburn v. Seda, 677 P.2d 173, 176-77
(Wash. 1984).
6. KENNETH J. MEIER, REGULATION: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMICS 77-78, 176-77
(1985); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of
Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525, 571-72 (1988).
7. MEIER, supra note 6, at 77-78, 176-77; Jost, supra note 6, at 571-72.
8. Jost, supra note 6, at 560-64.
9. See Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS 19, 202-05 (1990); DOUGLAS C.. MICHAEL, FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF AUDITED SELF-
REGULATION AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE 11-20 (1993) (Preliminary Draft for the Administrative
Conference of the United States) (to be published in 47 ADMIN. L. REV., No. 2 (1995)); Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations: A
Healthy Relationship?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Autumn 1994).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (Supp. III 1991) (requiring hospitals certified for Medicare on the basis
of Joint Commission accreditation to release their accreditation reports to the Department of Health
and Human Services on request); Jost, supra note 9 (discussing these provisions).
11. Joint Commission reports may be disclosed to the public in the context of enforcement
proceedings, for example. See infra text accompanying note 44.
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better information.t2 Accreditation could, in theory, inform consumers that the
care provided by a particular accredited institution was of acceptable quality, or,
even better, provide consumers with. a quality' scorecard allowing them to
"comparison shop" among institutions. 3 With quality information in hand,
consumers would be able to focus on price, making the market more competi-
tive. Under this vision of accreditation, disclosure of at least some information
becomes essential. Confidentiality must, in turn, be circumscribed.
In fact, all three of these visions of accreditation to some extent describe the
roles of health care and educational accreditation bodies in the United States.
Institutions rely on accreditation for peer review and self-improvement. The
government relies on accreditation for various regulatory purposes. Finally, the
public relies on accreditation to identify entities providing services of acceptable
quality and may increasingly demand comparative information from accreditors
as well. Accreditation disclosure and confidentiality policy must, therefore,
accommodate all three of these interests.
It must, however, accommodate other interests as well.14 First, accredited
institutions may have legitimate interests in some level of confidentiality.
Institutions seeking accreditation may disclose sensitive information, such as
financial data, to the accrediting bodies; public disclosure of such information
could give competitors an unfair advantage or otherwise harm the institution.15
For example, proposals to purchase real estate could, if revealed, affect the price
of the property. Likewise, information regarding adverse treatment results or
suspected negligence could be relevant in litigation against the institution or its
staff. Similarly, professionals who have provided information to the accrediting
body in confidence (including administrators, employees, faculty, and medical
staff), along with consumers who have made statements critical of the institution
or of its administrators or employees, may want this information (or at least
their identities) kept confidential. 6 There is also a significant risk of liability
on the part of accrediting agency if derogatory accreditation information is
12. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE:
INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS 187-205 (1988) (discussing generally the value of information for
consumers of medical care, and specifically the value of accreditation information); Havighust & King,
supra note 1, at 134-38 (discussing the use of certification for facilitating consumer choice).
13. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 12; Havighust & King, supra note
1, at 134-38.
14. Perhaps the best consideration of the various interests at stake in control of health care
information is still the Institute of Medicine Study on Professional Standards Review Organization
disclosure policy, summarized in Searching for a Balance in Medical Data Disclosure, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
Winter 1981, at 62.
15. HEILBRON, supra note 3, at 10, 11; see also cases cited infra note 55 (involving attempts by
medical negligence plaintiffs to discover accreditation information).
16. HEILBRON, supra note 3, at 10, 11. Employee fear of reprisals for giving accreditors
information critical of employing institutions may be well grounded. See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp.
Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980) (nurse fired for providing adverse information on
hospital to JCAHO). The Joint Commission will on request protect the anonymity of persons who
complain about accredited institutions. Telephone interview with Eleanor Wagner and Harold Bressler,
General Counsel's Office, JCAHO (July 22, 1993).
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widely disclosed. 17 The accomodation of these interests is the subject of the
remainder of this article.
III
DISCLOSURE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Historically, the confidentiality of accreditation information has been
protected by the internal policies of accrediting entities and by law. 8
Increasingly, however, as regulators have come to rely on accreditation decisions
for public purposes, the trend has been for government to demand greater
access to accreditation information.19
In the health care area, this movement has been clear. The original 1965
Medicare statute permitting deemed status for hospitals accredited by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (the "JCAH"), now the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (the "JCAHO" or
the "Joint Commission"), did not authorize the then Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare ("HEW") to seek disclosure of accreditation informa-
tion.2' HEW would only be informed of the accreditation status of hospitals
and of the withdrawal of accreditation status, not of the analysis supporting
particular accreditation decisions.2" This position was undoubtedly based on
the traditional view that accreditation information was confidential peer review
information.
Within five years, however, a controversy arose, first as to whether it was
appropriate, or indeed constitutional, for Congress to delegate to accrediting
agencies nonreviewable discretion to determine Medicare certification status,
and second, assuming that it was not, as to whether HEW needed access to
accreditation reports to hold the Joint Commission accountable for its
accreditation decisions.' In response to these concerns, the Social Security Act
was amended in 1972 to permit both random and complaint-based validation
17. See Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980) (permitting lawsuit
against ABA accreditation consultant to proceed for allegedly defamatory remarks made during the
accreditation process); American Int'l Hosp. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 483 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. App. 1985)
(affirming dismissal of defamation suit brought by hospital denied accreditation against Joint
Commission and newspaper); see also Peter H. Schuck, Tort Liability to Those Injured by Negligent
Accreditation Decisions, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (Autumn 1994).
18. The Wall of Confidentiality Around Joint Commission Survey Reports Continues to Crumble,
8 HosP. L. NEWSLETrER, Feb. 1991, at 1 [hereinafter The Wall of Confidentiality].
19. Joint Commission to Share Information with State and District Licensure Agencies, JoINT
COMM'N PERSPECTIVES (Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs.), Nov./Dec. 1989, at 8;
General Counsel's Office, Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Development of JCAHO
Confidentiality Guidelines, 24 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 134 (1991); The Wall of Confidentiality, supra note
18, at 1.
20. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1861(e)(8), 1865,79 Stat. 286, 315,
326-27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e)(9), 1395bb (1988)).
21. Id.
22. See William Worthington & Laurens H. Silver, Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The
Need for Change, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (Spring 1970).
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inspections and to require disclosure of accreditation decisions by hospitals to
HEW for validation purposes.2'
The 1972 amendments permitted disclosure only to the degree necessary to
permit agency monitoring of private accreditation efforts. The 1989 amend-
ments to the Medicare statute went further, permitting the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") to require disclosure of reports from all
accredited hospitals, not just from those subject to validation.24 The current
federal statute requires institutions seeking deemed status to authorize the
JCAHO
to release to the Secretary upon his request (or such State agency as the Secretary may
designate) a copy of the most current accreditation survey of such institution made by
such Commission, together with any other information directly related to the survey
as the Secretary may require (including corrective action plans). '
It also requires the Joint Commission to release this information.26 Recently
adopted regulations include these statutory requirements.27
23. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 244,86 Stat. 1329, 1422-23 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x, 1395z, 1395aa, 1395cc (1988)).
24. The amendments also authorized the Secretary to make public such information to the extent
it related to an enforcement action taken by the Secretary. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6019(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2165-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395bb (Supp. III 1991)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
26. Id.
27. 58 Fed. Reg. 61,816, 61,837-38, 61,840 (1993). Under these rules, 42 C.F.R. § 401.126(b)(2)
reads as follows:
(2)(i) Except as specified in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, HCFA may not
disclose any accreditation survey or any information directly related to the
survey (including corrective action plans) made by and released to it by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the American
Osteopathic Association or any other national accreditation organization that
meets the requirements of § 488.6 or § 493.506 of this chapter. Materials that
are confidential include accreditation letters and accompanying recommenda-
tions and comments prepared by an accreditation organization concerning the
entities it surveys.
(ii) Exceptions. (A) The Secretary may release the accreditation survey of any
home health agency; and
(B) The Secretary may release the accreditation survey and other information
directly related to the survey (including corrective action plans) to the extent the
survey and information relate to an enforcement action taken by HCFA ....
Section 401.133 is amended by adding new paragraphs (d) and (e) to read as follows:
The following shall be made available to the public under the conditions specified:...
(d) Accreditation surveys. Upon written request, HCFA may release the
accreditation survey and related information from an accreditation organization
meeting the requirements of § 488.5 or § 488.6 or § 493.506 of this chapter to
the extent the survey and information relate to an enforcement action taken.
. .by HCFA ....
(e) Upon written request, HCFA will release the accreditation survey of any
home health agency.
Section 488.5 is revised to read as follows:
(c)(1) A provider or supplier deemed to meet program requirements under
paragraph (a) of this section must authorize its accreditation organization to
release to HCFA and the State survey agency a copy of its most current
accreditation survey, together with any information related to the survey that
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.The requirements of the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendments
of 1988 ("CLIA") 28 are similar but somewhat more sophisticated. CLIA
permits HHS to certify accredited laboratories if the accreditation program
meets certain requirements. It further requires HHS to make available annually
to physicians and to the general public, inter alia, "a list of laboratories whose
accreditation has been withdrawn or revoked together with a statement of the
reasons for withdrawal or revocation."'29 Regulations implementing the Act
require that accreditation agencies supply the Health Care Financing Agency
("HCFA") with electronic data related to adverse actions stemming from
proficiency testing results as well as data on proficiency testing failures.3" The
accreditation agencies must also notify HCFA within ten days of deficiencies
they identify in accredited laboratories when such deficiencies pose an
immediate threat to the laboratory's patients or a hazard to the general
public.3"
The federal government also relies on educational accreditation for certain
purposes, primarily for awarding student aid.32 The Higher Education Act33
(the "HEA") requires disclosure to the Secretary of Education within thirty
days of adverse actions (including probations) imposed by accreditation
bodies. 4 It further requires disclosure to both the Secretary of Education and
to the public of a summary of reviews resulting in termination, suspension, or
denial of accreditation, together with the comments of affected institutions.35
In order for an accrediting agency to earn approval from the Secretary, it
must maintain and make available to the public written materials describing its
own standards and procedures for accreditation and appeals, as well as
information regarding the accreditation status of each institution under its
jurisdiction.36 The Department of Education must also disclose to the public
HCFA may require (including corrective action plans).
(2) HCFA may determine that a provider or supplier does not meet the
Medicare conditions on the basis of its own investigation of the accreditation
survey or any other information related to the survey.
(3) Upon written request, HCFA may disclose the survey and information
related to the survey-
(i) Of any HHA; or
(ii) Of any other provider or supplier specified at paragraph (a) of this section
if the accreditation survey and related survey information relate to an
enforcement action taken by HCFA.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 263(a).
29. Id. § 263a(n)(4).
30. 42 C.F.R. § 493.506(b)(2)(v) (1992).
31. Id. § 493.506(b)(3)(ii).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b (Supp. IV 1992); see also Matthew W. Finkin, The Unfolding Tendency in
the Federal Relationship to Private Accreditation in Higher Education, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89
(Autumn 1994); Jeffrey C. Martin, Recent Developments Concerning Accrediting Agencies in
Postsecondary Education, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121 (Autumn 1994).
33. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1988).
34. Id. § 1099b(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1992).
35. Id. § 1099b(a)(8).
36. Id. § 1099b(c)(5).
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the fact that it is considering an institution of higher education under its
jurisdiction for accreditation or reaccreditation.37  Regulations implementing
the 1992 amendments require educational accrediting agencies to submit "[u]pon
request of the Secretary information regarding an accredited or preaccredited
institution's compliance with its Title IV, HEA program responsibilities,
including its eligibility to participate in Title IV, HEA programs, for the purpose
of assisting the Secretary in resolving problems with the institution's participa-
tion in these programs."38 Higher education regulations previously in place
had merely required accreditation agencies to notify HHS within thirty days of
decisions to withdraw accreditation or to place institutions on publicly
announced probation. 9
In addition to the federal government, states rely on accreditation
information for making licensure or other decisions. Pursuant to this reliance,
state governments also often require information from the accrediting bodies as
to the basis of their decisions. Approximately forty-two states and the District
of Columbia rely on JCAHO accreditation in whole or in part for licensing
health care institutions.' Several of these state statutes (thirty-two by the
JCAHO's count) require institutions seeking licensure to disclose survey reports
to the state agency.41
37. Id. § 1099b(c)(6).
38. 59 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,255 (1994). The proposed rule had required accrediting agencies to
submit "[ulpon request, information to assist the Secretary in resolving problems with any institution
or program accredited by the agency, provided that the request does not conflict with the agency's
policies on confidentiality with respect to its records on those institutions or programs." Id. at 3578,
3592. This rule was limited in its scope because of many comments received by the department
claiming that the requirement would compromise the confidentiality necessary for peer review. See id.
at 22,266. The department's response to these comments notes that under its final rule,
... an agency does not have to provide the Secretary with copies of an institution's self-study
report, reports of on-site evalutations of the institution by the accrediting agency, or other
documents maintained by the agency about the institution for the purpose of determining the
institution's compliance with the agency's standards. However, the agency must provide any
information contained in those documents that is relevant to the institution's compliance with
its Title IV, HEA program responsibilities.
Id. at 22,267.
39. 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(f) (1993).
40. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., State Project Status Report (July 15, 1992)
(unpublished memorandum, on file with the author) [hereinafter JCAHO State Status Report]; see, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 18.20.080(a) (1993) (hospitals); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-3(b) (1991) (health facilities);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 135J.2 (West Supp. 1993) (hospices); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-403(d)
(alcohol and drug abuse treatment programs), § 10-504 (1994) (mental health facilities); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 630.705(3), (6) (Supp. 1993) (mental hospitals); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-138(g) (1993) (home
health agencies); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.02(a) (Baldwin 1993) (hospitals).
41. JCAHO State Status Report, supra note 40; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0161 (West 1993);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-308(c) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. § 144.55, subd. 4 (Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-210(b)(5)(B) (Supp. 1993).
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IV
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ACCREDITATION INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES
Statutes that permit disclosure of accreditation documents to the government
obviously raise the possibility that the government might make that information
public. In 1975, HEW released to consumer organizations (who had filed a
Freedom of Information Act request) deficiency letters that it had obtained
from the Joint Commission under the 1972 statute.42 When the Joint Commis-
sion sued to maintain confidentiality of this information, the suit was settled
with HEW agreeing not to release Joint Commission accreditation letters or
accompanying recommendations or comments.4 3  The federal statute,
regulations, and proposed regulations on health care accreditation now
specifically prohibit public disclosure except "to the extent that information is
related to an enforcement action."'  This exception is based on the obvious
fact that the government cannot take enforcement action based on adverse
accreditation information unless it is able to introduce in subsequent proceed-
ings evidence gained from accreditation agencies. Beyond this narrow
exception, public disclosure of information gained by the government with
respect to most accredited health care institutions is prohibited.
There is, however, one category exempted from the general policy of
nondisclosure of health care information: accreditation reports regarding home
health agencies are fully subject to public disclosure.45 Deemed Medicare
certification status for accredited home health agencies was adopted in the face
of serious concerns raised by consumer groups.' This opposition was related
to even more widespread opposition to deemed status for nursing homes, which
surfaced in response to Reagan Administration proposals to rely on nursing
home accreditation for determining federal participation status.47 Requiring
full disclosure of home health accreditation reports-permitting greater public
42. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation
of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 856-57 (1983).
43. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps. v. Weinberger, No. 75 C 175 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 1975)
(dismissed by stipulation).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (Supp. III 1991); 42 C.F.R. § 401.126(b)(2) (quoted supra note 27).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb.
46. The American Bar Association's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly played a leading
role in this debate. In August 1986, the Commission released a report entitled THE BLACK Box OF
HOME CARE QUALITY through the House Select Committee on Aging, reviewing regulation of the
quality of home care. In August 1987, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a policy recommendation
based on this report, which, inter alia, resolved that "deemed status" be extended to accredited home
health agencies only if certain conditions were met, including the full accessibility of survey results to
the public.
47. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES 1-2
(1986); Jost, supra note 42, at 844; see also Iris C. Freeman, Blast or Boost? How the Joint Commission
Fared in the Institute of Medicine's Nursing Home Study, QRB, Dec. 1986, at 415.
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oversight of the home health accreditation process-made deemed status
somewhat more palatable to these groups.
Public disclosure has been less of an issue id the education area. Such
information, when disclosed to the Department of Education, may be made
public under the Freedom of Information Act, but it would be subject to the
act's exceptions, such as the exception for confidential commercial or financial
information.' Under rules implementing the Higher Education Act amend-
ments, confidential agency materials examined by the Department would not
become part of the Department's permanent files on the agency, presumably to
assure that they not become public under the Freedom of Information Act.49
At the state level, seventeen of the states that rely on Joint Commission
accreditation for licensure prohibit redisclosure of Joint Commission accredita-
tion information to the public (subject to some exceptions, such as the Rhode
Island exception for imminent dangers to public health)." Fourteen of the
states that rely on accreditation for licensure make accreditation reports
available to the public, although some limit availability to final findings."1 A
handful of state statutes also address the availability of educational accreditation
information.52
V
LITIGATION INVOLVING ACCESS TO ACCREDITATION INFORMATION
Accreditation information in government hands is sought for various
purposes. The loss of accreditation by a local hospital or university is obviously
news of great public interest. The media have therefore sought, and occasional-
ly obtained, accreditation information.53 Institutionalized patients have also
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988); see HEILBRON, supra note 3, at 20 (discussing these exceptions).
49. 59 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,255 (1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 602.10(c)).
50. JCAHO State Status Report, supra note 40; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-15.1 (1988) (survey reports
not public except insofar as director of licensing agency makes public information disclosing imminent
danger to public health; accreditation reports on state institutions are also public information); see also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-21-9 (Supp. 1993) (public disclosure prohibited except for a summary prepared
by the Department relating to licensure standards).
51. JCAHO State Status Report, supra note 40; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-133(b) (1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 135B.12 (for hospital accreditation, final findings only, except in licensure
proceedings), 135H.13(1) (West Supp. 1993) (similarly for psychiatric hospital accreditation); WYo.
STAT. § 35-2-907(b) (Supp. 1993) (after deletion of information that identifies patients).
52. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-239j (West Supp. 1993) ("Within forty-five days of receipt of
a New England Association of Schools and Colleges accreditation report for any public school, the local
or regional board of education which has jurisdiction over such school shall publicly disclose the results
of the report at a public meeting of the board of education and shall make the report available for
inspection upon request.").
53. Georgia Hosp. Ass'n v. Ledbetter, 396 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Ga. 1990) (Joint Commission records
relied on by Department of Human Resources in licensing hospitals must be disclosed to newspapers
under Georgia Open Records Act); Nassau-Suffolk Hosp. Council Inc. v. Whalen, 390 N.Y.S.2d 995,
996, 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (Hospital Council brought action to enjoin disclosure of JCAH accreditation
documents to newspaper; court held that under the New York Freedom of Information Act, survey
reports must be disclosed if received by the Health Department without a promise of confidentiality,
and withheld if received with a promise of confidentiality).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 57: No. 4
sought information regarding the loss of accreditation by facilities in which they
are institutionalized. 4
Accreditation information is also sought directly from accrediting bodies
where individuals or institutions require it for their own private purposes. Most
of the court cases regarding access to accreditation information involve plaintiffs
in medical negligence cases who are claiming corporate negligence on the part
of a hospital and are trying to gain access to accreditation documents to prove
that a hospital knew or should have known of the problem that allegedly caused
the injury.5s  These cases generally deny discovery, but usually do so under
state medical peer review statutes, requiring awkward characterizations of the
Joint Commission as a "professional standards review organization"56 or an
"allied medical society., 57 Providers subject to adverse accreditation actions
might also seek the information on which the accreditation decision was
based.58 These cases may raise issues of confidentiality of information
regarding patients not involved in the litigation or by complaining patients or
employees, whose privacy also deserves some respect.
VI
DISCLOSURE OF ACCREDITATION INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS
If we move into a reformed health care system based on competition among
providers and networks of providers, the most important disclosure issue may
become that of potential disclosure of accrediting information to consumers (or
to their agents, be they health plans or health alliances) to facilitate purchasing
54. Patients of Philadelphia State Hosp. v. Commonwealth, 417 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1980) (patients entitled to access to Joint Commission accreditation report on state hospital under
Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Act where report relied on by state agency in licensing facility).
55. See Fretz v. Keltner, 109 F.R.D. 303, 311 (D. Kan. 1985) (plaintiffs in malpractice action sought
Joint Commission accreditation documents; discovery denied as Joint Commission is a "peer review
committee" within Kansas peer review protection statute, and thus documents nondiscoverable);
Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378, 380, 384 (Colo. 1981) (discovery sought of Joint Commission
survey report in personal injury action against hospital; court held that absent a statutory privilege, the
report was not privileged; remanded to determine whether report or any part of it covered by Colorado
utilization review or physician-patient privileges); Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (I11. 1985)
(plaintiffs in malpractice action sought survey reports and information submitted by hospital to Joint
Commission; court held that information held by Joint Commission protected by peer review privilege
statute covering "allied medical societies"); Zion v. New York Hosp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 188,189 (App. Div.),
appeal withdrawn, 81 N.Y.2d 881 (1992) (Joint Commission report denied to malpractice plaintiff
because report exempt from disclosure under § 6527(3) of the New York Education Law which exempts
the records of "professional standards review organizations"); O'Neill v. McKeesport Hosp., 48 Pa. D.
& C. 3rd 115, 118'(1987) '(Joint Commission documents, reports, and recommendations protected by
Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act in medical malpractice).
56. Zion, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
57. Niven, 487 N.E.2d at 942.
58. Cf. Wilfrid Academy v. Southern Ass'n of Colleges and Sch., 738 F. Supp. 200, 207 (S.D. Tex.
1990), rev'd on other grounds and vacated, 957 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1992) (district court determined that
association acted arbitrarily and capriciously in withdrawing accreditation, in that it, inter alia, made
vague and general charges and failed to provide adequate supporting information when requested to
do so; Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court failed to give "due deference" to
association's decision).
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decisions. Similar issues may also emerge in the education area. The role of
accreditation agencies as market facilitators, noted at the outset of this article,
may become paramount.
If accreditation is in fact a valid measure of quality, the fact of accreditation
should be useful for consumers seeking quality services.59 The fact of an
adverse accreditation action might be even more relevant to decisions of
whether or not to purchase services from an educational or health care
institution. At a minimum, therefore, the fact of accreditation vel non must be
readily available to the public if accreditation is to play any role at all in
assisting consumers.
A recent survey by the Chronicle of Higher Education found that all but one
of the six regional college accrediting bodies make available to the public
information on college accreditation status, and several of these accrediting
entities release, with the consent of the affected colleges, status reports
concerning the colleges' accreditation histories.' In early 1994, the National
Policy Board on Higher Education, representing the six regional agencies,
committed itself to a policy of making available to the public reports concerning
their evaluation of individual colleges and universities.61
The Joint Commission currently makes available even more information
regarding health care institutions that it accredits. With respect to a particular
institution, the Joint Commission discloses to inquirers the hospital's accredita-
tion status; the number of Type 1 recommendations (recommendations for
corrective action that could affect an accreditation decision) and the nature of
these recommendations affecting a hospital; the hospital's accreditation history;
the dates of a hospital's next survey; the status of a hospital in the accreditation
process; the standards under which a survey was conducted; the hospital
components involved in a survey; the standards areas involved in a complaint
review; the number and nature of substantiated and substantive written
complaints filed against an accredited hospital since its last regular survey; the
organizational components that contributed to a decision of conditional
accreditation or denial of accreditation; and whether or not there were
outstanding Type 1 recommendations at the time a hospital withdrew from
accreditation and the nature of those recommendations.62 Home health agency
accreditation reports on which deemed status are based, as noted above, are
subject to full disclosure.
More useful, however, would be information that allowed consumers to
consider the opinion of the accrediting agency as to the relative quality of
various accredited institutions. The Joint Commission adopted a policy on May
59. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 12, at 197-200 (discussing the
validity and reliability of hospital accreditation as information for consumers).
60. Leatherman, supra note 2, at A16.
61. Samuel Weiss, College Officials Agree to Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, at A19.
62. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., 1994 ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS xxxvii-xxxviii (1993).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
17, 1993, that proposes making available by 1994 both the substance of Type 1
recommendations and accreditation decisionmaking grids, which score
performance areas such as nursing care and infection control.63 The institution
would also receive an overall 1 to 100 score, thus permitting the Joint
Commission to provide comparable data from similar institutions to those who
request it.' It will also provide requesters with comparative data, permitting
the requester to compare the performance of an institution in a particular area
to that of comparable institutions. Though questions will undoubtedly be raised
as to the validity and reliability of this information, it has the potential of being
very useful to consumers.
It is not coincidental that the Joint Commission has moved toward greater
disclosure at this moment. The Joint Commission, like other players in the
health care industry, is seeking to position itself for health care reform.
Traditionally, its clients have been the hospitals it accredits, the doctors who
founded it and have over the years held a majority of the positions on its
governing board, and the federal and state governments that depend on the
information it produces.65 In the future, consumers and their purchasing
agents, who may come to depend upon the Joint Commission for comparative
quality information, may be its most important clients. Other accreditors should
also take note of these developments and follow suit.
VII
CONCLUSION
The overall trend is clearly toward greater disclosure of accreditation
information. This trend is salutary, both because it makes regulation through
accreditation more accountable and because it can facilitate consumer
sovereignty. Though this trend may chill peer review, this effect may be
minimal for two reasons. First, the movement toward greater openness of
government and consumer information generally in recent years has probably
lowered expectations, and thus demands, for confidentiality on the part of large
educational or health care institutions with respect to accreditation information.
Second, the increasing dependence of health care and educational institutions
upon accreditation for securing public benefits and contracts leaves them with
little choice but to pursue accreditation on whatever terms it is offered.'
These terms increasingly include public disclosure of accreditation information.
While the trend toward greater disclosure is to be applauded, ultimately it
must be tempered by those concerns noted at the outset. Privacy of information
regarding specific patients or students, for example, must not be compromised.
63. News Release, Joint Commission Prepares for Release of Organization-Specific Performance
Data: Expands Policy on Falsification of Information (May 17, 1993) (copy on file with author).
64. Id.; see also Linda Oberman, Top Accreditor Goes Public on New Hospital Report Cards, AM.
MED. NEWS, Oct. 10, 1994, at 3.
65. Jost, supra note 9.
66. Id.
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Individuals must be permitted to approach accrediting bodies with complaints
or concerns regarding accredited entities without fearing disclosure of their
identities. Proprietary commercial information should still be subject to general
protection. In short, as accrediting bodies become more transparent, they must
ultimately consider where paramount policy concerns dictate retaining certain
areas of opacity, just as federal and state freedom of information acts have
retained certain exceptions and have been balanced by privacy acts to strive for
the correct equilibrium of disclosure and privacy where the government is
involved.67
67. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (b) (1988).

